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Introduction 
In recent years, public awareness about tax havens and the connected issues of tax evasion 
and corporate tax avoidance has dramatically increased. With the financial crisis, tax havens 
came increasingly under fire because of their central role in the rise of the so-called shadow 
banking system. Criticism towards tax havens was also deeply rooted in social justice and 
fairness considerations. The following growth of public deficits and austerity plans in many G20 
countries combined with a series of prominent tax scandals, such as the Lux leaks revelations 
and the Panama Papers, seemed to have put a major strain on tax havens and abusive tax 
behaviour, both by single individuals and multinational corporations. At their London Summit, 
the G20 leaders declared themselves ready to ‘protect public finances and international stand-
ards against the risks posed by non-cooperative jurisdictions’ and ‘take agreed action against 
those jurisdictions’ (2009: 4). As a result, the OECD increased its efforts in promoting interna-
tional tax transparency and launched a new project against base-erosion and profit-shifting 
(BEPS) practices of multinational corporations. Also the EU didn’t rest on its laurels and initi-
ated a range of measures addressing specifically the issues of tax evasion and avoidance.  
Accordingly, taxation reappeared on the agenda of many scholars, with issues of international 
tax governance and tax cooperation being at the centre of a growing body of literature in polit-
ical sciences and political economy. This literature has worked from national or global perspec-
tives, focusing on either the influence of powerful nation states and interest groups or the work 
of international organizations, such as the OECD. Important developments at the EU level 
were at best mentioned briefly, but not investigated in a comprehensive manner. This paper 
proposes to close this gap by adding a European perspective to the ongoing discussion on tax 
cooperation.  By analysing the evolution of EU corporate tax policy since 2003 it provides a 
detailed account of all tax provisions related to corporate taxation (and not only single 
measures) and it reconstructs the evolution of this policy field over a longer time period, thereby 
allowing for a better understanding of the conditions under which tax cooperation and policy 
change can happen at the EU level. My main results show that the EU is increasingly gaining 
influence over taxation and the series of recent initiatives represent a substantial shift in EU 
corporate tax policy in comparison to the pre-crisis status quo. Not only is the EU clearly in-
tensifying its regulatory efforts in the field of tax transparency and company taxation. This 
change also came with the identification of new problems, solutions and underlying justifica-
tions along the ideas of fairness and transparency. Furthermore, this change did not happen 
immediately after the crisis but later, from 2013 on.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, I will review the existing literature dealing with the 
issues of tax competition and cooperation at the international and European level.  Based on 
a critical assessment of those contributions, I will then provide a short overview of the theoret-
ical considerations underlying the decision to investigate policy change in line with the Multiple-
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Streams Framework. In a next step, I will reconstruct the change in EU corporate tax policy by 
chronologically reviewing EU corporate tax provisions since 2003 and conducting a quantita-
tive content analysis of 936 official documents published by the Commission and the Council 
between 2003 and 2017. Finally, I will discuss possible explanations for this change, such as 
the impact of the crisis, the interrelationship between the EU and the OECD, the role of prom-
inent tax scandals and the Commission’s entrepreneurship. 
1. Understanding tax competition and tax cooperation 
Seeking an explanation for the reduction in marginal tax rates in most industrialized countries 
since the 1970s, numerous scholars emphasize the role of globalization and tax competition 
in creating convergence pressures on national tax policies (e.g. Lee and McKenzie 1989; 
Swank and Steinmo 2002; Tanzi 1995). They argue that increasing capital mobility forces gov-
ernments to decrease effective tax rates on capital income, corporate profits and high-income 
earners, thereby leading to a race to the bottom (Frey 1990). To explain the emergence of tax 
competition, Rixen (2008) reconstructed the institutional trajectory of international tax govern-
ance. According to him, it was the necessity to eliminate double taxation in a context of eco-
nomic liberalization at the beginning of the 20th century that lead to the current system of 
bilateral tax treaties supervised by the OECD. From the 1960s onwards, this system created 
the problematic situation of tax competition, under-taxation and tax avoidance. As a reaction, 
the OECD launched a project on Harmful Tax Competition (HTC) in 1998. While it is generally 
seen as the first relevant attempt to curb tax competition and tax avoidance, it was also under-
mined by several problems (Woodward 2016). Explanations differ as to why the work of the 
OECD resulted in such a suboptimal outcome. Some authors focus on the critical role of small 
tax havens and powerful business groups who managed to undermine the legitimacy of the 
project by framing it as being unfair and following a double standard (Sharmann 2006; Webb 
2004). Others claim that the project failed because of the withdrawal of US support after the 
election of the Bush administration (Hakelberg and Rixen 2017; Rixen 2010). Since then, in-
ternational tax cooperation has been limited to a system of voluntary bilateral Tax Information 
Exchange Agreements (TIEAs). After the financial crisis however, the OECD improved this 
system by making the TIAEs mandatory. Similar to the literature about the HTC project, most 
contributions insist on the limitations of the new rules. Rixen (2013) refers for instance to the 
problem of capture of national governments by powerful domestic financial interest groups. 
Another aspect consists in the international organizations’ tendency to compromise on weak 
standards to secure international agreements. Accordingly, the OECD preferred to promote an 
unambitious solution in order to gather a broad support for its own tax agenda (Eccleston and 
Woodward 2015).  
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A few years later the OECD stepped up to the plate with the introduction of a new multilateral 
system of automatic information exchange (AEOI) in 2012. Most authors trace this game-
changing development back to the diffusion effect of the Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance 
Act (FATCA), which was enacted in 2010 in the US (Lips 2018; Palan and Wigan 2014). Fi-
nally, reacting to parliamentary inquiries in the US and UK in early 2013 and a range of tax 
scandals involving high-profile multinationals, the G20 mandated the OECD to develop an ac-
tion plan addressing explicitly the issue of tax avoidance. This resulted in the latest Base Ero-
sion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. While the OECD developed this project on behalf of 
the G20, Eccleston and Smith (2016) argue that the motivation for the BEPS project came less 
from the G20 than from within the OECD itself. Other authors emphasize the central role of 
new actors, such as the professionals of the Tax Justice Network and the impact of a politici-
zation process, whereby the debates on international taxation shifted from a technical to a 
political level and also increasingly included fairness considerations (Büttner and Thiemann 
2017; Forstater and Christensen 2017; Seabrooke and Wigan 2016).  
Parallel to those changes at the international level, similar developments can be observed 
within the European context. Notwithstanding the no-taxation thesis advanced by many schol-
ars (e.g.: Börzel 2005; Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002), the EU does play a role in the taxation 
field. Despite restricted own resources, a narrow tax mandate and the limitation of the unanim-
ity rule, the EU’s influence over national tax systems is not only substantial but also increasing 
(Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2009). Clearly, this phenomena varies across the different types 
of taxes, as direct taxation is less constrained than indirect taxation. However, the EU influence 
on corporate taxation is not negligible either. Because of its concerns with the fundamental 
freedoms and the general principle of non-discrimination, the European Court of Justice was 
highly critical of protective national legislations and worked diligently towards the elimination 
of corporate tax obstacles (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2011). At the same time, the EU 
adopted several directives that aimed specifically at removing tax barriers and abolishing dou-
ble taxation, such as the Merger Directive and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive from 1990 and 
the Interest & Royalties Directive from 2003 (Uhl 2006). Taken together, the ECJ jurisprudence 
and EU legislation accelerated corporate tax competition to a point that it is now stronger within 
the EU than in the rest of the world (Ganghof and Genschel 2008; Genschel et al. 2008).  
Similar to the OECD, the EU started to address the problem of harmful tax competition at the 
end of the 1990s, mostly with the establishment of the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation 
in 1998. However, the code is not legally binding and its impact is quite limited. In this context, 
most scholars were concerned with explaining the unlikelihood of tax cooperation in the EU. 
Dehejia and Genschel (1998) trace back the unsuccessful attempts to implement a common 
withholding-tax on interest income in the 1990s to two specific distributional conflicts: between 
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winners and losers of tax competition, and between co-operators and non-cooperating outsid-
ers. In a similar way, Holzinger (2005) reconstructed the bumpy road to the 2003 agreement 
on the Savings Directive by looking into the preference heterogeneity of the member states in 
an asymmetric coordination dilemma. Adopting a different perspective, Radaelli (1995) looked 
into the policy process that led to the adoption of the Merger Directive and Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive in 1990. He identifies the emergence of new frames, such as subsidiarity and neu-
trality, and the building of a supranational advocacy coalition as the main factors explaining 
this policy change (Radaelli 1995). More recently, Radaelli and Kraemer investigated the adop-
tion of the tax package of 2003 and argue that tax cooperation was made possible through the 
emergence of two different governance arenas, which were the result of a political strategy of 
the European Commission to ‘balance the power relations between Brussels, the member 
states, and the business community’ (2008: 318). 
Following the increasing efforts of the EU in the fight against tax evasion and avoidance, a 
growing number of scholars recognize that the EU is becoming a ‘major player in international 
tax politics’ (Christensen 2016). Accordingly, a range of contributions started to provide de-
scriptive reviews and qualitative assessments of the new EU provisions, such as the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive (Cédelle 2016; Kuzniacki 2017), the Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base (Hakelberg 2017; Morgan 2017) or the latest project on digital taxation (Christensen 
2018). Yet, this emerging body of literature focuses only on single and recent measures, or 
even on proposals that are highly unlikely to be adopted. In comparison, the present analysis 
includes all provisions relevant to corporate taxation since 2003, thus providing a more accu-
rate picture of the evolution of EU corporate tax policy over time. 
2. Policy-making and Multiple Streams Framework 
Most of the contributions focusing on the institutional embeddedness of tax competition, the 
power relations between winners and losers of tax competition, the role of single states or the 
influence of interest groups can only explain as much as failed tax cooperation. When it comes 
to the few success stories, the authors mentioned above have to resort to a more differentiated 
set of tools. On the actors’ side, they would for instance include the role of experts and profes-
sionals, NGOs and tax activists, media organizations, international bureaucracies, single poli-
ticians or parliamentary committees. On the mechanisms’ side they would refer to diffusion 
processes and learning, bureaucratic logics inherent to international organizations, aspects 
related to political salience and politicization, the impact of crisis, and last but not least discur-
sive elements, such as rhetorical contests, framing and narratives. Indeed, those explanations 
acknowledged the issue of bounded-rationality, and tend to resort to more constructivist or 
sociological and discursive institutionalist explanations based on the role of ideas and related 
discursive processes.  
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While providing a detailed overview of constructivist theories would go beyond the scope of 
this paper, I would like to clarify my understanding of policy-making in line with the Multiple-
Streams Framework (MSF) of John Kingdon (1984). Accordingly, policy-making should be un-
derstood as a socially constructed process where problems are identified and selected, solu-
tions are produced and choices are made. Following the logic of the Garbage Can Model, it is 
a process ‘in which problems, solutions, and participants move from one choice opportunity to 
another’ (Cohen et al. 1972: 16). This understanding is also the basis for Kingdon’s Multiple-
Streams Framework that ‘explores which issues get attention and when, how and which actors 
are mobilized to participate in a given choice opportunity, how issues are framed and meaning 
generated, and how the process is politically manipulated by skilled policy entrepreneurs’ 
(Ackrill et al. 2013: 872). The underlying assumptions of the MSF are concerned with three 
different aspects: Actors have to act under substantial time constraints, problems and solutions 
are produced independently from each other, and the policy-making is characterized by a high 
level of ambiguity. Time especially plays a crucial role, because the elaboration of policy solu-
tions requires time, whereas the selection of problems generally happens in a short time span. 
This contradiction constrains the options of the decision-makers who cannot deal with all prob-
lems and will probably have to settle on suboptimal solutions or even make a choice before 
having clear and well-defined preferences. Then, according to the MSF, the policy-making 
process consists of three independent streams: the problem stream (issues identified by pol-
icy-makers and citizens), the policy stream (ideas and solutions developed by experts) and the 
politics stream consisting of the political environment (Ackrill et al. 2013). Eventually, policy 
change happens ‘when a “window” of opportunity opens and a policy entrepreneur merges the 
three streams by applying an idea from the policy stream to an issue in the problem stream at 
a time when the problem/solution coupling is acceptable within the political stream’ (Nowling 
2011: 44-45). In this process, (mass) media and public opinion can play ‘a significant role in 
temporal sorting, propelling politics forward and exerting pressure to act’ (Rüb 2016: 60). As 
such, media become a driving force behind the coupling mechanism of problems and solutions. 
In short, the three streams of problems, policies and politics usually flow independently from 
each other and have to meet to produce policy change. This can happen only when a policy 
window opens and makes it possible for new ideas to be considered, and when policy entre-
preneurs come into play to couple the streams around those new ideas. Before looking into 
the policy and problem streams of EU corporate tax policy, let us examine first what happened 
in terms of concrete policy development. For a better overview, I will systematically evaluate 
the relevant provisions according to two differentiation criteria: whether they belong to the area 
of tax transparency or company taxation, and whether they qualify as hard- or soft-law tools. 
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3. EU corporate tax policy since the crisis 
Until the crisis, hard-law provisions in the area of company taxation consisted of three direc-
tives that aimed at eliminating tax obstacles and preventing double taxation in the Single Mar-
ket: the Merger Directive, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest & Royalties Di-
rective. Introduced in 1990, the Merger Directive aimed at removing fiscal obstacles to cross-
border re-organizations involving companies situated in different Member States. In 2005 it 
was amended to broaden its scope, cover a larger range of companies and further facilitate 
cross-border re-structuring. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive from 1990 was introduced to elim-
inate double taxation of parent companies on the profits of their subsidiaries and abolish with-
holding taxes on payments of dividends between associated companies of different Member 
States. The directive was amended in 2003 to strengthen those two provisions. In the same 
year, the EU adopted the Interest & Royalties Directive, which aimed at removing withholding 
tax obstacles in the area of cross-border interest and royalty payments within a group of com-
panies. In addition, the discussions about a common system of corporate taxation were revived 
in 2001 with a Communication from the Commission on a Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base (CCCTB).  
In the area of tax transparency, hard-law measures consisted of the Mutual Assistance Di-
rective from 1977 and the Savings Directive, which was agreed upon in 2003. The Directive 
on Mutual Assistance provided a framework for national tax administrations regarding the re-
covery of taxes, customs and certain fees, and complemented the existing provisions of bilat-
eral tax treaties concluded between the Member States. With the Savings Directive the EU 
introduced for the first time an automatic system of exchange of information on private savings 
income. However, it took more than 15 years to reach an agreement on the Directive, whose 
impact was weakened because of many flaws. Finally, in the soft-law area, the EU set up the 
Code of Conduct for Business Taxation in 1990 and the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (JTPF) 
in 2002. As mentioned already, the code is a non-binding instrument dealing with the issue of 
harmful tax competition. The JTPF works within the OECD framework and proposes the Com-
mission non-legislative solutions to practical problems posed by transfer pricing practices.  
Immediately after the crisis, we can observe a few new developments. In the area of company 
taxation, the Commission proposed to amend the Interest & Royalties Directive to add provi-
sions against tax evasion via hybrid financial instruments. No agreement could be found until 
now, even though the proposal was made in 2011. In addition, the proposal of the Commission 
regarding the CCCTB was rejected in 2011. In the area of tax transparency, the Mutual Assis-
tance Directive was repealed and replaced by the Directive on Administrative Cooperation in 
2011, which implements the OECD standard for exchange of information on request. In the 
soft-law field, the promotion of tax good governance, mostly in relations to third-countries, was 
added to the existing tools. It seems that corporate taxation and tax avoidance did not belong 
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to the priorities of the EU when dealing with the immediate consequences of the financial crisis. 
Indeed, the most interesting developments in this field happened later.  
In March 2012, the European Council called on the Council of the EU and the Commission to 
elaborate policy solutions to the problem of tax fraud and tax evasion. In reaction, the Com-
mission presented its action plan in December 2012. The main goal of the action plan is to set 
out ‘concrete steps to enhance administrative cooperation and to support the development of 
the existing good governance policy’ (European Commission 2012: 1). In addition, the Com-
mission produced two specific recommendations regarding tax havens and aggressive tax 
planning. After the action plan, the EU became increasingly involved with the issues of tax 
evasion and avoidance, especially with measures related to the field of tax transparency. A 
major step was taken with the introduction of country-by-country reporting (CBCR) for financial 
institutions with the fourth Capital Requirements Directive in June 2013, as well as for other 
major corporations with the revision of the Accounting and Transparency Directives between 
June and October 2013. A second innovation consisted in the introduction and expansion of 
AEOI with several amendments of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation. In line with the 
new OECD standards, the EU introduced the automatic exchange of financial account infor-
mation in December 2014. After four amendments, the Directive now provides for the auto-
matic exchange of a broad range of information, such as: tax rulings, country-by-country-re-
ports, anti-money laundering information and information related to cross-border arrange-
ments. In addition to the Directive on Administrative Cooperation, the EU also signed agree-
ments entailing similar provisions with five non-EU countries, such as Switzerland and Liech-
tenstein. Also interesting is the Commission’s proposal from 2016 that requires multinational 
companies to make their country-by-country reports accessible to the public. However, the 
Member States could not find any agreement on the proposal so far, mostly because of Ger-
many’s resistance (Schumann 2018). 
The EU became increasingly active in the area of company taxation too. In January 2015, a 
general anti-abuse rule was added to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive with the aim of closing 
loopholes being used for particular tax planning arrangements. With the adoption of the Anti-
Tax Avoidance Directive in October 2016, the EU introduced a set of six legally binding 
measures targeting the most common forms of aggressive tax planning. While the interest 
limitation rule, the rule on hybrid mismatches and Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules 
were derived directly from the BEPS project, the exit taxation rule, the switch-over clause and 
the general anti-abuse rule were additional proposals from the Commission (De Masi 2016). 
In May 2017, the directive was amended to include hybrid and other forms of mismatches, 
which were not covered previously. In addition, the Commission initiated two other ambitious 
projects, which are still waiting for an agreement in the Council: the CCCTB and rules regard-
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ing the taxation of the digital economy. After the first proposal was rejected in 2011, the Com-
mission proposed to re-launch the CCCTB in October 2016 with a two-step process: the com-
mon base should be implemented first, before consolidation can take place. Regarding the 
taxation of the digital economy, the Commission proposed two new directives in March 2018. 
The first one would introduce a tax on digital services as an interim solution, until the second 
one is agreed upon. The second directive consists in a long-term solution ensuring that taxa-
tion occurs where profits are generated, even if a company does not have a physical presence 
there.  
Regarding soft-law provisions, the work on tax good governance resulted in the elaboration of 
the common EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions in December 2017. After a lengthy screen-
ing and dialogue process, 17 countries were put on the blacklist and 47 countries were put on 
notice. However, the fact that the list does not cover well-known tax havens (both within the 
EU and internationally) left observers highly sceptical. Even Pierre Moscovici, the Commis-
sioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs acknowledged that the list 
‘remains an insufficient response to the scale of tax evasion worldwide’ (cited in: Gallego 
2017). In the meantime, the Directorate General for Competition took on a pragmatic stand 
towards tax avoidance by investigating the tax ruling practices of Member States on a case by 
case basis. The goal of these state aid investigations is to determine whether the tax treat-
ments granted to a specific company in one Member State constitute a breach of EU state aid 
rules and as such contribute to unfair competition. Some of the prominent cases include the 
tax treatment of Apple in Ireland, Starbucks in the Netherlands, as well as Amazon, Fiat, and 
ENGIE in Luxembourg.  
To sum up, the change in EU corporate tax policy did not occur in the aftermath of the crisis, 
but later, from 2013 on. The change in the policy stream can be described along three broad 
lines.  First, there is a clear increase of hard-law provisions, both in the tax transparency and 
company taxation fields. Especially in the area of company taxation, there is a shift from leg-
islation eliminating tax obstacles and double taxation to an anti-abuse legislation dealing ex-
plicitly with aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance. Second, a new soft-law dimension 
focusing on tax good governance and relations with third-countries was added to the dimen-
sions of harmful tax competition and transfer pricing. Finally, those developments were ac-
companied by tougher state aid investigations, eventually leading Donald Trump to complain 
to Jean-Claude Juncker about the Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager for being 
the ‘tax lady’ who ‘hates the US’ (cited in: Zalan 2018). 
  
Roland: European Corporate Tax Policy since the Crisis 
 
 
Working Paper No. 3, October 2018 | 11 
4. Evolution of the problem and policy streams since the crisis 
After having reconstructed the development of the policy stream in terms of concrete corporate 
tax provisions, I now intend to understand how the identification of problems and selection of 
solutions at the EU level evolved over time. For this purpose, I conducted a quantitative content 
analysis of 936 official documents published by the Commission and the Council of the EU 
between 2003 and 2017.1 All documents refer to corporate taxation. They range from legisla-
tive acts and proposals to working documents, meeting documentation and documents related 
to public communication, such as press releases and speeches. The decision to focus on the 
Commission and the Council was based on the fact that the European Parliament was involved 
only in a limited number of cases, and the ECJ does not participate in the decision-making 
process at all. The 2003-2017 time frame was selected because there are enough studies 
investigating tax policy developments before 2003 (see section 1), and it allows for a compar-
ison between the periods before and after the crisis. After cleaning the data, I created a dic-
tionary of relevant keywords or key phrases, which I selected on the basis of a previous ex-
plorative analysis of a representative sample of documents (Grimmer and Stewart 2013; 
Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). Inspired by the differentiation between the problem and policy 
streams, the structure of the dictionary consists of three root categories: solutions, problems 
and goals. The detailed structure of the dictionary is outlined in appendix 1.  
Working with the content analysis and text mining software WordStat, I then performed a de-
scriptive frequency analysis depending on three time periods (2003-2007, 2008-2012, 2013-
2017). Specifically, I looked at the column percentage, meaning how the frequency of a specific 
keyword/key phrases in relation to the total frequency of all other keywords/key phrases in a 
given time period changed from one period to the other. Thus, the following figures display the 
percentages for a certain keyword in relation to all keywords from the same category for the 
three time periods, not the absolute frequencies. The column percentage and significance level 
of the different elements of each category (solutions, problems and goals) can be found in 
appendix 2. The first interesting result relates to the distribution of the documents over the 
three time periods. While 50 % of the documents were produced between 2013 and 2017, the 
two former time periods are covered with only 25 % of the documents respectively. This con-
firms the observations made above, that the EU did intensify its legislative efforts in corporate 
tax policy, and that this change did not happen immediately after the crisis, but later.  
Regarding concrete policy solutions, figure 1 shows that there is a clear increase of references 
related to hard-law provisions (company taxation and tax transparency), accompanied by a 
steady decrease of references associated with soft-law instruments. This suggests that hard-
                                                          
1 About the use of quantitative text analysis, see for instance: Krippendorff (2004), Lemke and Wiedemann (2016) 
or Monroe and Schrodt (2008). 
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law became the preferred policy tool, while soft-law approaches progressively became less 
important.  
Figure 1: Policy solutions between soft- and hard-law 
  
 
The increasing relevance of hard-law in comparison to soft-law can be attributed to a rapid 
growth of references related to tax transparency measures, while mentions referring to com-
pany taxation stayed more or less constant between the first and the last period. In the area of 
company taxation the almost exclusive emphasis on the CCCTB was weakened for the benefit 
of anti-tax avoidance measures (figure 2). A similar development occurred in the tax transpar-
ency field, where the focus on AEOI slightly shifted towards CBCR (figure 3).  
Figure 2: Hard-law in the field of company taxation 
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Figure 3: Hard-law in the field of tax transparency 
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Now turning to the problem stream, figure 5 illustrates the evolution of the relative importance 
of references related to tax avoidance, evasion, fraud and abuse, issues related to double 
taxation and other problems over the different time periods. In the years before the crisis, the 
focus was clearly on issues related to double taxation and tax fraud. This changed after the 
crisis, when tax evasion was added to the repertoire of problems to deal with. Tax avoidance 
did not become a priority immediately after the crisis, but from 2013 on. In fact, the term cor-
porate tax avoidance was not mentioned once in the years before 2013, indicating that it was 
not perceived to be a problem at all! The new focus on tax avoidance, which is increasingly 
apparent in the documents, can be best illustrated with this quote from a Commission’s press 
release about the AEOI. Accordingly, ‘corporate tax avoidance is thought to deprive EU Mem-
ber States’ public budgets of billions of euros a year. It also undermines fair burden-sharing 
among tax-payers and fair competition between businesses. Companies rely on the complexity 
of tax rules and the lack of cooperation between Member States to shift profits and minimise 
their taxes’ (European Commission 2015a).  
Figure 5: Shifting problem definitions 
  
 
Over the years, the issue of double taxation stays present (figure 6). Yet, concerns are less 
about tax obstacles, but increasingly about the issue of double non-taxation, which was a cen-
tral reason for the amendment of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive in 2013. According to the 
Commission’s proposal, ‘double non-taxation is one of the key EU areas for urgent and coor-
dinated action: it forms part of an on-going effort to improving the proper functioning of the 
Internal Market, by closing tax loopholes generated by exploiting the differences in national tax 
systems. Double non-taxation deprives Member States of significant revenues and creates 
unfair competition between businesses in the Single Market’ (European Commission 2013).  
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Figure 6: From double taxation to double non-taxation 
 
 
Furthermore, the initial emphasis over harmful tax competition has progressively shifted to-
wards the issue of aggressive tax planning (figure 7). In its Communication about the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Package, the commission explains for instance that ‘a healthy Single Market needs 
a fair, efficient and growth-friendly corporate tax system, based on the principle that companies 
should pay taxes in the country where profits are generated. Aggressive Tax Planning under-
mines this principle’ (European Commission 2016a).  
Figure 7: From harmful tax competition to aggressive tax planning 
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Figure 8 shows how references to the most common goals of tax policy change in relation to 
each other over the three periods. Looking at those goals contributes to a better understanding 
of the justifications behind the selection of problems and solutions. While the focus was clearly 
on stability and competitiveness in the first period, it progressively shifted towards transpar-
ency and fairness. According to Pierre Moscovici, the EU has even a ‘duty to make corporate 
taxation fairer and more transparent, and to use every means possible to block tax abuse. We 
have an obligation to take every measure possible to stop profit shifting, prevent base erosion 
and ensure that all companies pay their fair share of tax where they make their profits’ (Euro-
pean Commission 2016b).  
Figure 8: Goals shifting from competitiveness and stability to fairness and transparency 
 
 
Yet, it should be noted that transparency and fairness have a specific and somewhat limited 
meaning in this context. Greater transparency does not imply full public access to tax data, but 
solely better information sharing between tax authorities. Similarly, the recurrent claim that 
multinationals should pay their fair share of tax does not give any indication about the amount 
of tax they should pay, or what tax rate would actually be a fair one. It only means that they 
should pay some taxes, in contrast to no taxes at all. The fairness narrative is further under-
mined by the fact that it is often associated with the concepts of tax competition and level-
playing field (figure 9). Fair tax competition is generally used as the acceptable opposite pole 
to harmful tax competition. In this view, fairness refers only to non-distorted competition, which 
is still considered as being a positive incentive for investment and fiscal discipline: ‘Fair com-
petition on tax rates is to be encouraged. Differences in rates allows a certain degree of tax 
competition to be maintained in the internal market and fair tax competition based on rates 
offers more transparency and allows Member States to consider both their market competi-
tiveness and budgetary needs in fixing their tax rates’ (European Commission 2011). 
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Figure 9: Fairness and competition 
 
 
The repeated references to the concept of level-playing field add another limitation to the un-
derstanding of fairness, as it focuses on a fair distribution of the tax burden between different 
types of businesses. As such it excludes other (non-business) taxpayers from the fairness 
consideration. The emphasis generally lies on small- and medium sized enterprises: ‘SMEs 
will also benefit from measures against tax avoidance – which can offer them fairer competition 
and a more level playing field. International profit shifting creates a competitive disadvantage 
for smaller companies that do not have the means for aggressive tax planning […]. Corporate 
tax avoidance can result in SMEs carrying a heavier tax burden, as governments compensate 
for the revenue losses’ (European Commission 2015b). Interestingly, this specific understand-
ing of fairness seems to weaken, as references related to fair tax competition and level-playing 
field decrease over time, and tend to be supplemented by more generic accounts of fairness. 
The broader definition of fairness in terms of universal social justice can be illustrated with this 
quote from Pierre Moscovici about the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive: ‘Billions of tax euros are 
lost every year to tax avoidance – money that could be used for public services like schools 
and hospitals or to boost jobs and growth. Europeans and businesses that play fair end up 
paying higher taxes as a result. This is unacceptable and we are acting to tackle it. Today we 
are taking a major step towards creating a level-playing field for all our businesses, for fair and 
effective taxation for all Europeans’ (European Commission 2016c). 
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Discussion 
This article has examined the possibility of tax cooperation from a European perspective. In 
contrast to existing contributions, it provided a detailed review of all provisions related to cor-
porate taxation over a longer period and was able to show that EU corporate tax policy has 
undergone a significant change in recent years: Away from removing tax obstacles and double 
taxation, towards more transparency and elimination of abusive tax practices. Apparently, tax 
cooperation is becoming a viable option within the EU.  In addition, this paper analysed this 
change from a multiple streams perspective to understand how the EU perception of corporate 
tax problems and solutions has also changed over time. As the last section shows, the stream 
metaphor fits well the case of European tax policy. The new emphasis on fairness and trans-
parency is very much in line with the identification of new problems (e.g. tax avoidance and 
aggressive tax planning) in the problem stream, and the selection of new solutions (e.g. AEOI 
and anti-abuse rules) in the policy stream.  
Now, a next step consists in explaining this change. A first aspect is related to the role of the 
EU as an international actor in relation to the OECD and the US. Some of the measures men-
tioned above directly followed from OECD recommendations or US unilateral initiatives, thus 
relativizing the potential leadership of the EU. Yet, the EU introduced the AEOI with the Sav-
ings Directive already in 2003, far before the US or OECD. The EU also initiated many inno-
vations independently from the OECD and actually took the fight against tax avoidance so far, 
that it has been accused of launching a tax war on the US. Investigating the nature of the 
relationship of the EU with the US and OECD appears as a promising avenue for future re-
search on EU corporate tax policy in particular, and international tax cooperation in general.  
Crises are also common explanations for changes similar to those described above. After the 
financial crisis however, the EU was not concerned with the issue of corporate tax avoidance, 
which appeared on its agenda only in 2013. Admittedly, the sovereign debt crisis may have 
had an indirect impact by fostering a general feeling of unfairness when taxpayers discovered 
that multinationals were not paying taxes and not contributing to the general efforts following 
from the austerity plans. But this free-riding behaviour needed to be exposed in the first place 
thanks to the range of major tax scandals, such as the Lux leaks or Paradise Papers. Still 
insufficiently studied, the role of media leaks and strategic media organizations seem worthy 
of investigation to better understand processes of policy change. A final question addresses 
the position of the Commission as a strong and independent actor influencing the international 
tax agenda. While the Commission’s entrepreneurship is no longer contested, the reasons for 
it are still quite obscure. Possible lines of inquiry could include the lack of legitimacy of the 
Juncker Commission after the Lux leaks revelations, the role of single personalities, such as 
Pierre Moscovici and Margrethe Vestager, and the supranational agenda of the Commission 
as a whole.  
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In any cases, better understanding EU corporate tax policy opens up interesting opportunities 
for future research. International relations scholars could get useful insights into the conditions 
under which cooperation takes place. Similarly, this case study provides valuable material to 
the research on EU integration and policy-making processes. And finally, by exploring the role 
of media leaks in the emergence of windows of opportunity or differentiating the concept of 
policy entrepreneurship, this research agenda yields promising results for scholars wishing to 
further elaborate the Multiple-Streams Framework.  
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Appendix 1: Solutions, problems and goals - Coding and absolute word counts  
 
Appendix 1 a: Solutions - Coding and absolute word counts 
 
2003-2007 2008-2012 2013-2017
DIGITALTAX* 54
MERGERDIRECTIVE 48 8
PSD 73 18 170
IRD 42 17 23
CCCTB 276 263 617
CCTB 2 15 65
CTB 192 49 42
ATAD 87
ATAP 54
GAAR 11 103
*AEOI 45 70 739
*EOI 270 426 393
AUTOMATICEXCHANGE 1 7 72
EXCHANGE_INFORMATION 41 39 139
SAVINGSAGREEMENT 18 37 12
SAVINGSDIRECTIVE 85 127 182
SAVINGSTAX* 266 101 108
ADMINISTRATIVECOOPERATION* 44 214 294
ACCOUNTINGDIRECTIVE* 3 27
CRD 18 32
CBCR 7 319
CODEOFCONDUCT* 363 176 320
TAXGOODGOVERNANCE 3 148 249
LISTNON* 75
LISTTHIRD* 18
TRANSFERPRICING* 309 73 229
JTPF 188 33 36
*STATEAID* 288 160 651
Hard-law: 
Tax 
transparency
AEOI
CBCR
Soft-law and
State aid
List
Transfer 
pricing
Hard-law: 
Company
taxation CCCTB
Anti-tax
avoidance
Coding Absolute word count
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Appendix 1 b: Problems – Coding and absolute word counts 
 
Appendix 1 c: Goals – Coding and absolute word counts 
 
2003-2007 2008-2012 2013-2017
*AVOIDERS 2 4 13
ANTIAVOIDANCE* 25 5 99
ANTITAXAVOIDANCE 18
AVOID_PAYING 4 48
AVOID_TAXATION 5 17
CORPORATETAXAVOIDANCE 181
TAXAVOIDANCE* 81 80 696
*EVADERS 2 21 64
ANTIEVASION* 1 3
EVASION 3 32 27
TAXEVASION 70 322 756
ANTIFRAUD* 31 69 138
FRAUDSTERS 9 20 18
TAXFRAUD 179 223 278
ABUSIVE_TAX* 3 41
ANTIABUSE* 52 40 291
TAXABUSE 16 3 61
TAXTREATYABUSE 17
DOUBLETAX* 424 264 300
*TAXOBSTACLE 154 62 56
DOUBLENONTAXATION 10 23 75
*NONCOOPERATIVEJURISDICTION 22 42
TAXHAVEN 18 69 208
AGGRESSIVE_TAX* 6 62 1063
HARMFUL_TAX* 83 78 133
UNFAIR_TAX* 4 7 29
Other problems
Tax fraud
Tax abuse
Double (non) taxation
Tax havens
Absolute word countCoding
Tax avoidance
Tax evasion
2003-2007 2008-2012 2013-2017
*PLAYINGFIELD 41 50 221
FAIR_TAX* 10 52 230
FAIRNESS* 8 14 183
FAIRNESSOF_TAX* 4 18
TAXTRANSPARENCY 4 279
TRANSPARENCY* 175 187 869
TRANSPARENCYOF_TAX* 2 4 6
TRANSPARENT_TAX* 1 11
EFFICIENCY* 184 168 286
EFFICIENCYOF_TAX* 8 25
EFFICIENT_TAX* 1 16 40
EFFECTIVE_TAX* 74 77 203
EFFECTIVENESS* 105 119 265
EFFECTIVENESSOF_TAX* 2 3 12
NEUTRAL_TAX* 9 1 3
NEUTRALITY* 37 18 33
NEUTRALITYOF_TAX* 2 3
TAXNEUTRALITY 9 5 5
CERTAINTY 25 14 50
TAXCERTAINTY 101
STABILITY* 282 153 283
STABILITYOF_TAX* 3
STABLE_TAX* 2 3
COMPETITIVE_TAX* 2 9 8
COMPETITIVENESS* 239 150 428
COMPETITIVENESSOF_TAX* 1 1 1
Certainty
Stability
Competitiveness
Absolute word countCoding
Fairness
Transparency
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Neutrality
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Appendix 2: Shifting solutions, problems and goals - Column percent and significance 
level2 
 
Appendix 2 a: Shifting solutions - Column percent and significance level 
 
Appendix 2 b: Shifting problems - Column percent and significance level 
 
                                                          
2 The differences between the different time periods are tested for significance with the Chi²-Test, which indicates whether the 
correlation between the frequencies of specific keywords and the respective text corpus is significant. The significance is 
calculated based on the standardised residuals: 
Stand. Res. >=2,0, Sign. P<0,05, symbol: * 
Stand. Res. >=2,6, Sign. P<0,01, symbol: ** 
Stand. Res. >=3,3, Sign. P<0,001, symbol: *** 
2003-2007 2008-2012 2013-2017 2003-2007 2008-2012 2013-2017
HARDLAW: COMPANY 
TAXATION 633 381 1215 24,8 (n.s.) 18,9 (***) 23,8 (n.s.)
HARDLAW: 
TAXTRANSPARENCY 773 1046 2317 30,2 (***) 51,9 (***) 45,3 (**)
SOFTLAW 863 430 927 33,8 (***) 21,3 (n.s.) 18,1 (***)
STATE AID 288 160 651 11,3 (n.s.) 7,9 (***) 12,7 (**)
DIGITALTAX* 0 0 54 0 (***) 0 (**) 4,4 (***)
MERGERDIRECTIVE 48 8 0 7,6 (***) 2,1 (n.s.) 0 (***)
PSD 73 18 170 11,5 (n.s.) 4,7 (***) 14 (***)
IRD 42 17 23 6,6 (**) 4,5 (n.s.) 1,9 (**)
CCCTB 470 327 724 74,2 (n.s.) 85,8 (*) 59,6 (n.s.)
ANTITAXAVOIDANCE 0 11 244 0 (***) 2,9 (***) 20,1 (***)
AEOI 770 1021 1939 100 (**) 98 (*) 84 (**)
CBCR 3 25 378 0 (***) 2 (***) 16 (***)
CODEOFCONDUCT* 363 176 320 32 (***) 30 (n.s.) 20 (***)
TRANSFERPRICING* 497 106 265 43 (***) 18 (***) 17 (***)
TAXGOODGOVERNANCE 3 148 249 0 (***) 25 (***) 16 (***)
LIST 93 0 (***) 0 (***) 6 (***)
*STATEAID* 288 160 651 25 (***) 27 (*) 41 (***)
Hard-law in the field of company taxation
Hard-law in the field of tax transparency
Soft-law and state aid
Column %Absolute values
Policy solutions between soft- and hard-law
2003-2007 2008-2012 2013-2017 2003-2007 2008-2012 2013-2017
AVOIDANCE 108 98 1072 9,2 (***) 6,9 (***) 22,9 (***)
EVASION 76 375 850 6,5 (***) 26,4 (***) 18,2 (**)
FRAUD 219 312 434 18,7 (*) 22 (***) 9,3 (***)
ABUSE 68 46 410 5,8 (***) 3,2 (***) 8,8 (***)
DOUBLE-TAXATION 588 349 431 50,3 (***) 24,6 (**) 9,2 (***)
TAXHAVENS 18 91 250 1,5 (***) 6,4 (n.s.) 5,4 (**)
OTHER_TAXPROBLEMS 93 147 1225 7,9 (***) 10,4 (***) 26,2 (***)
DOUBLETAX* 424 264 300 72,1 (n.s.) 75,6 (n.s.) 69,6 (n.s.)
*TAXOBSTACLE 154 62 56 26,2 (***) 17,8 (n.s.) 13 (**)
DOUBLENONTAXATION 10 23 75 1,7 (***) 6,6 (n.s.) 17,4 (***)
AGGRESSIVE_TAX* 6 62 1063 6,5 (***) 42,2 (***) 86,8 (***)
HARMFUL_TAX* 83 78 133 89,2 (***) 53,1 (***) 10,9 (***)
UNFAIR_TAX* 4 7 29 4,3 (n.s.) 4,8 (n.s.) 2,4 (n.s.)
Absolute values
Shifting problem definitions
From double taxation to double non-taxation
From harmful tax competition to aggressive tax planning
Column %
Roland: European Corporate Tax Policy since the Crisis 
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Appendix 2 c: Shifting goals - Column percent and significance level 
 
 
 
 
2003-2007 2008-2012 2013-2017 2003-2007 2008-2012 2013-2017
FAIRNESS 59 120 652 4,9 (***) 11,3 (*) 18,3 (***)
TRANSPARENCY 177 196 1165 14,7 (***) 18,5 (***) 32,6 (***)
EFFICIENCY 185 192 351 15,3 (***) 18,1 (***) 9,8 (***)
EFFECTIVENESS 181 199 480 15 (***) 18,8 (***) 13,4 (***)
NEUTRALITY 55 26 44 4,6 (***) 2,5 (n.s.) 1,2 (***)
CERTAINTY 25 14 151 2,1 (n.s.) 1,3 (***) 4,2 (*)
STABILITY 284 153 289 23,5 (n.s.) 14,4 (n.s.) 8,1 (***)
COMPETITIVENESS 242 160 437 20 (***) 15,1 (n.s.) 12,2 (***)
*PLAYINGFIELD 41 50 221 69,5 (***) 41,7 (n.s.) 33,9 (n.s.)
FAIR_TAXCOMPETITION 6 36 77 10,2 (n.s.) 30 (***) 11,8 (n.s.)
FAIRNESS 12 34 354 20,3 (**) 28,3 (**) 54,3 (*)
Column %Absolute values
Fairness and competition
Goals shifting from competitiveness and stability to fairness and transparency 
